Questions and Answers:
Bitcoin is, in a lot of ways, less private than a bank account. With a bank, you only disclose your finances to the bank and their designees. With Bitcoin, you disclose it to the world since the block chain and all your transactions are public. Naïvely, you might think this is not an issue, since your name is not associated with your Bitcoin address(es)/public key(s). However, it is not very hard to identify who an address belongs to based on spending patterns. So if you have any desire for your neighbors or retailers not to know what you spend your money on, you should be interested in techniques to anonymize Bitcoin. Zerocoin is the only solution to this that offers provable anonymity even if everyone running the network is out to get you.
Not yet. We have released a prototype library exposing the zerocoin functionality. See software. For Zerocoin to be useful, however, it either needs to be integrated into Bitcoin, adopted by some other alternative block chain currency (far more likely), or become an alternative currency itself and get some adoption. This will take time and other people’s involvement. Follow @ZerocoinProject on Twitter and check this site for updates.
There is no backdoor and there never was. This was a misinterpretation of the following quote in the paper and a less than ideally phrased answer in an interview.
Since all Bitcoin transactions are public, anonymous transactions are necessary to avoid tracking by third parties even if we do not wish to provide the absolute anonymity typically associated with e-cash schemes. On top of such transactions, one could build mechanisms to partially or explicitly identify participants to authorized parties (e.g., law enforcement). However, to limit this information to authorized parties, we must ﬁrst anonymize the underlying public transactions.
The idea was even if you are one of the “if you haven’t done anything wrong, you have nothing to hide [from the government]” people (an assertion that we by no means agree with), you’d still want privacy from the general public. After all, we have banking secrecy laws for a reason – you don’t want your neighbors knowing your financial details even if you want the FBI to know everything about criminals or terrorists. Even if you wanted that world, you’d need something like Zerocoin to make sure only the “good guys” could use it.
Not covertly. The paper has a provably secure protocol in it which is anonymous (technical note: anonymity holds even if the RSA key used in the accumulator is retained, so no that’s not a backdoor), so absent modifications there is no way to track users. The software will be open source and so any attempt to modify the protocol by inserting a backdoor would be rather obvious.
As with any protocol (Bitcoin included), the government could mandate an overt locked “frontdoor” so to speak. On a technical level, these kind of things tend not to work for decentralized systems. Moreover, since Zerocoin will be open source any version that had such a frontdoor in it would likely be forked and have it removed.
First, the main problem with money laundering tends to be making the money appear legitimate (after all, they nailed Al Capone for tax fraud), not actually moving it around. Anonymity doesn’t help with that since you need to actually identify the sources of your income (e.g., for tax purposes) to show it is legitimate.
However, Bitcoin and Zerocoin obviously make it easier to move money around, which is step one in laundering money. There are, however, promising techniques for preventing money laundering without violating the privacy of non-launderers (e.g., this paper). The basic idea is if you spend more than x amount in one transaction (e.g., ten thousand USD/BTC/), then the transaction is identified. If you spend less than that, you are completely anonymous. This does not depend on a trusted party to make the determination, rather it is a property of the cryptographic protocol.
Zerocoin does not implement this functionality at all, nor can we force it on people even if we did. Considerably more work needs to be done to apply these techniques to Bitcoin and Zerocoin and to prevent more sophisticated money laundering techniques (and even some unsophisticated ones like spending money through intermediaries), but it is a promising research topic. Whether anyone wants to adopt this kind of technology is a policy question (as are what the exact thresholds or patterns that trigger identification). There must be a consensus on this to adopt it and put it in the code. Without that consensus, it would remain a topic relegated to research papers since miners would not adopt the modified code and users would not use it.